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Abstract: The High Redundancy Actuator (HRA) concept is a novel approach to fault tolerant actuation that uses high 
numbers of small actuation elements, assembled in series and parallel in order to form a single actuator which has intrinsic 
fault tolerance. Whilst this structure affords resilience under passive control methods alone, active control approaches are 
likely to provide higher levels of performance. A multiple-model control scheme for a HRA applied through the framework 
of multi-agent control is presented here. The application of this approach to a 10x10 HRA is discussed and consideration of 
reconfiguration delays and fault detection errors made. The example shows that multi-agent control can provide tangible 
performance improvements and increased fault tolerance in comparison to a passive fault tolerant approach. Reconfiguration 
delays are shown to be tolerable, and a strategy for handling false fault detections is detailed. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Traditional approaches to fault 
tolerant actuation 
In automated processes, faults in hardware or 
software often produce undesired reactions. Faults 
can lead to system failures, where expected actions 
are not completed, possibly resulting in damage to 
the plant, its environment or people in the vicinity 
of the plant [1]. A fault tolerant system is able to 
avoid failure and achieve adequate system 
performance in the presence of faults. 
The majority of fault tolerance research to date 
has concentrated on sensor faults [2, 3, 4, 5]. 
Most of these strategies are not applicable to 
actuator faults. This is attributable to the 
fundamental differences between actuators and 
sensors. Sensors deal with information, and the 
signals they produce may be processed or 
replicated analytically to provide fault tolerance. 
Actuators, however, must deal with energy 
conversion, and as a result actuator redundancy is 
essential if fault tolerance is to be achieved in the 
presence of actuator faults. Actuation force will 
always be required to keep the system in control 
and bring it to the desired state [6]. No approach 
can avoid this fundamental requirement. 
The common solution involves straightforward 
parallel replication of actuators [7, 8, 9, 10]. Each 
redundant actuator must be capable of performing 
the task alone and possibly override the other 
faulty actuators. This over-engineering incurs 
penalties as cost and weight are increased and 
subsequently efficiency is reduced. It also can not 
deal with lock-up (fail-fixed) faults easily. 
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1.2 High Redundancy Actuation 
High Redundancy Actuation (HRA) takes a 
different approach to this problem. The HRA concept 
is inspired by musculature, where the tissue is 
composed of many individual cells, each of which 
provides a minute contribution to the overall 
contraction of the muscle. These characteristics allow 
the muscle, as a whole, to be highly resilient to 
individual cell damage.  
This principle of co-operation in large numbers of 
low capability modules can be used in fault tolerant 
actuation to provide intrinsic fault tolerance. The 
HRA uses a high number of small actuator elements, 
assembled in parallel and series, to form one high 
redundancy actuator (see Figure 1). Faults in 
elements will affect the maximum capability, but 
through control techniques, the required performance 
can be maintained. This allows the same level of 
reliability to be attained in exchange for less 
over-dimensioning. In addition, the combination of 
both serial and parallel elements allows for the 
intrinsic accommodation of both lock-up (loss of 
travel) and loose (loss of force) faults. 
 
Fig. 1  High redundancy actuation. 
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Through careful design for specific applications, 
HRA can provide a solution that continues to 
operate within the system's performance 
requirements in the presence of multiple faults in 
the elements, and gracefully degrades after the 
specific redundancy design limits have been 
reached. 
 
1.3 Fault Tolerant Control of High 
Redundancy Actuation 
Control is often integral to providing fault 
tolerance. The HRA project thus far has focused on 
using passive Fault Tolerant Control (FTC) to 
provide fault tolerance. Research to date suggests 
that this is a theoretically and practically viable 
approach [11, 12, 13, 14]. Passive FTC is where a 
single robust control law is designed, which should 
provide adequate stability and performance under 
both nominal and fault conditions. 
This concept with respect to HRA is illustrated 
by Figure 2. The behaviour of the nominal HRA is 
represented by a point bn in the diagram. 
Inevitably, a bound of uncertainty for the system 
surrounds this point, bn, and its uncertainty bound 
lies within a region of acceptable behaviours BPFT 
within which, the system is considered fault 
tolerant. Passive FTC aims to design a single 
robust controller that keeps the behaviours of the 
fault perturbed HRAs (points bf) within BPFT . 
Although the HRA has a capability level in 
excess of that required by the application, lock-up 
and loose faults reduce the overall travel or force 
capability respectively, and as such, there are fault 
limits dictated by the capability requirement. Thus, 
HRA under fault conditions in excess of this limit 
(represented by points bgd) will lie outside BPFT in 
BGD, a region that represents the HRA graceful 
degradation operation. 
The passive FTC approach is attractive, as its 
simplicity and constancy make it more easily 
verifiable for a high integrity application. 
However, if the region BPFT is restricted, then it 
can be difficult or impossible to retain {bf} within 
this region. 
Hence, active FTC approaches have also been 
investigated, which detect element faults and 
change the control in order to move the points bf 
closer to bn, into a behaviour region BAFT that 
provides improved performance under fault 
conditions within the limits of the system 
capability. 
This paper details a Multi-Agent System (MAS) 
inspired active FTC strategy for the HRA that aims 
to achieve near-nominal performance under the 
fault conditions. 
 
 
Fig. 2  Representation of passive and active fault tolerant 
control of HRA. 
 
1.4 Overview 
Section 2 gives a brief overview of MAS and 
presents a rationale for its use with HRA. Section 3 
then goes on to describe the current Multi-Agent 
Control (MAC) approach and its main features. An 
example is then presented in Section 4, where the 
MAC scheme is applied to a 10×10 HRA and its 
performance compared to a passive control 
strategy. Special considerations are made within 
the simulations for the reconfiguration period and 
fault detection errors. Finally, conclusions are 
made in Section 5 and the future directions of the 
research described. 
2 Multi Agent Control of High 
Redundancy Actuation 
2.1 Multi Agent Control 
The concept of agent was first given by Minksy 
[15]. In his book, 'The Society of Mind', he 
introduced the term agents to describe the 
workings of the mind. Each agent is only capable 
of a simple process, but these agents are numerous 
and diversely capable, and it is through the 
interaction of these agents that true intelligence can 
be achieved. The principles of Multi-Agent 
Systems (MAS) were further developed in the 
disciplines of distributed artificial intelligence and 
object-oriented programming 30 years ago, since 
when it has emerged as a discipline in its own 
right. 
Today, MAS concepts have become not only an 
important subject of research, but of industrial and 
commercial application in a diverse range of fields 
[16]. 
There is still some controversy within the agent 
community regarding what qualities should be 
included in the definition of an agent. There is a 
general consensus that autonomy is essential, but 
the attribution of other qualities is still under 
debate. However, the following definition, given 
by [17], conveys the key ideas: an agent is a 
physical or virtual entity situated in its 
environment, which acts autonomously and 
flexibly within its purview to achieve goals in a 
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real-time manner. A MAS therefore, is a collection 
of agents that are socially coupled and collaborate 
to achieve some objective, which in the case of 
MAC is the control of a system. 
These agent characteristics resemble the concept 
of closed-loop control, which achieves objectives 
through sensing and acting. However, there are 
important differences within the agent concept. 
The most obvious difference is the social 
interaction and negotiation that exists between 
agents. Also, the agent philosophy is strongly 
associated with localisation, a point emphasised by 
[18]. This means each agent only deals with a local 
environment, and not the whole plant. 
2.2 Rationale for Multi-Agent Control of 
HRA 
Taking a MA based perspective on HRA control 
design can provide two key features: structuring 
and flexibility. 
MAC and HRA are structurally similar (Figure 
3). Both are inspired by natural mechanisms which 
utilise large numbers of relatively simple 
cells/processes to form complex 
structures/behaviours. The HRA, viewed as a 
whole is a complex, changeable system. An 
unstructured approach to applying active FTC to 
this system is likely to make control 
reconfiguration complicated and fault diagnosis 
di-cult. However, if the HRA is viewed as a 
collection of simpler (if not similar) subsystems, 
then simple control reconfiguration and simple 
fault detection can be applied on a local level, and 
MAC can provide a framework for this. 
The structuring of control is often neglected 
within the field of control engineering, as the 
problem is stated in the form of a single plant 
model [19]. The process industry acknowledges 
that the structuring of control is an important issue 
in complex systems, thus it is given more attention 
in this field and numerous MACS have been 
proposed within this application area, for example 
[20]. 
Equally, a structured approach to control may be 
achieved through use of decentralised control 
techniques [21, 22]. However, these techniques do 
not necessarily facilitate the application of 
localised control reconfiguration and fault 
detection. In addition, the abstract approach to the 
control problem offered by MA concepts frees the 
design from the usual conventions. For example, 
the sharing of system parameters, capabilities and 
intentions are possibilities that may be derived 
from the multi-agent concept, but would not be 
considered within conventional distribution of 
control, as signals tend to be direct measured 
quantities [18]. This interaction between the agents 
is important as it implicitly acknowledges the 
interaction between the HRA elements. 
The flexibility and structuring provided by MAC 
also has advantages over more conventional active 
FTC techniques. Localisation of decisionary 
capabilities avoids the issue of single point of 
failure incurred by active FTC schemes that 
employ centralised fault detection or supervisors. 
The flexibility afforded by the communication 
involved in the agent approach also offers complex 
active control strategies to be employed with 
greater ease. 
 
 
Fig. 3  HRA and MAS. 
 
Hence, it is the combination of both structuring 
and flexibility that motivates the use of MAC 
above conventional decentralised control and 
centralised active FTC techniques. Nonetheless, 
there are a number of potential issues associated 
with MASs that require careful attention such as 
deliberation, communication and negotiation 
delays, agent non-consensus and communication 
failure. 
3 MACHRA Scheme 
HRAs have two main configurations of 
elements: Series-in-Parallel (SP) configuration, 
where serial branches of elements are connected to 
a load in parallel; and Parallel-in-Series (PS) 
configuration, where parallel elements are 
connected serially. These two configurations have 
equal nominal system capabilities, but differing 
tolerance to the two major fault types: lock-up and 
loose faults. The scheme described here refers to 
the PS configuration, which is most severely 
affected by lock-up faults. However, the concept is 
equally applicable to the SP or mixed 
configurations. 
The MAC of HRA scheme is essentially a 
decentralised multiple-model active FTC solution. 
The resultant control solution has two main 
properties: 
 
1. It can provide near nominal performance 
under fault conditions (if the fault level is 
within the fault limit Flim) after a 
reconfiguration period Tr has elapsed. 
2. It can provide near nominal performance in 
the case of false fault detections (up to the 
fault limit Flim). 
 
The first feature is achieved as a control law is 
designed for each possible fault condition. The 
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HRA is decomposed into similar physical 
subsystems and it is assumed that these subsystems 
operate in a finite number of modes, representing 
the nominal and fault conditions. For each mode, a 
classical control law is designed offline to provide 
a performance that is near to that of the nominal 
case. An agent-based framework is then applied to 
the decomposed HRA to detect faults locally and 
implement these pre-designed controllers. It would 
also be possible to apply adaptive control using 
this approach. However, a multiple-model based 
approach was favoured as this aids the certification 
of robustness and stability that would be necessary 
for high integrity applications for which HRA is 
intended. 
The reconfiguration of control through the 
agent-based framework will not be instantaneous. 
There will be some delay incurred by fault 
detection Tfd. Communication of the fault 
throughout the agency will also take a finite period 
(Tcom) and finally the reconfigured control will 
require certain time to settle (Ts). Hence, the 
reconfiguration time Tr may be expressed as: 
 
Tr=Tfd+Tcom+Ts      (1) 
 
The fault limit Flim for a HRA is the number of 
lock-up faults it is designed to accommodate. As 
lock-up faults essentially remove the travel 
capability of a parallel branch of elements, then the 
fault limit is the number of serial branches of 
elements, minus the number of serial elements 
required to achieve the required travel, i.e. Flim = 
Es - Er. 
3.1 MACHRA Architecture 
Matlab/Simulink is used to create and simulate 
HRA assemblies, details of which can be found in 
[23]. State Flow is used to simulate the inner 
rule-based logic of the agents and their 
communication. This provides a fast prototyping 
tool of the agents for use with Matlab/Simulink. 
3.1.1 Agency Architecture 
Figure 4 displays the MACHRA scheme's 
agency architecture for a m x n HRA PS 
configuration. In the figure, the extensibility of the 
architecture is indicated by the dashed lines. There 
is an agent per parallel branch of elements, each of 
which is responsible for the control and detection 
of faults within its elements and communication of 
faults to other agents. All agents within this 
scheme are identical and peers, consistent with 
multi-agent concepts where no hierarchy should 
exist. A fixed outer control loop provides each 
agent with an identical set-point. Communication 
between agents is transmitted via point to point 
links connecting neighbouring elements. This 
means that agents only consider messages from 
their structural neighbours in the first instance. 
However, if lock-up faults occur, the agents’ 
structural neighbours will change and thus other 
messages become relevant. It is the job of the 
affected agent to forward messages as necessary. 
This particular (structural neighbour) approach is 
taken as it limits the amount of I/O per agent 
regardless of the number of agents in the overall 
HRA.  Whilst this is a significant benefit, it also 
has the disadvantage of adding some delay in 
communication. 
 
Fig. 4  MACHRA agency architecture. 
 
 
Fig. 5  MACHRA agent architecture. 
 
3.1.2 Agent Architecture 
The agent architecture is illustrated in Figure 5. 
This architecture has similarities with 
subsumption, first introduced by [24], that uses 
behaviours layered in order of abstraction to 
produce more complex emergent behaviours in a 
reactive time frame. This reactivity is key in the 
HRA as, due to the fast dynamics of the 
electromagnetic elements, a purely deliberative 
architecture may not provide the response times 
needed. 
The Fault Detection Module (FDM) is the most 
abstracted layer, and thus affects those below it. As 
its name suggests, the FDM detects faults in its 
elements. Currently, only one fault type (lock-up 
faults) is detected. Future agents will have more 
than one module, arranged either as peers in a 
single layer or as separate layers ordered by the 
severity of the fault type. The module contains 
simple rule-based logic which determines the fault 
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status of the element based on sensory information 
and internal knowledge. Firstly, it is checked 
whether the elements are moving. If they are, then 
the system is not locked. However, if they are 
stationary, it is then determined whether they 
should be moving according to the agent's input 
command and the mechanical limits of the system. 
Hence, faults are only detected during transient 
periods of operation. This is sufficient as elements 
that lock during steady-state have no effect on the 
system in that period. 
If a fault is detected, the agent updates its 
internal fault state, FSi. This information is passed 
to the Fault Communication Module (FCM) where 
it is relayed to other agents. Fault status messages 
from other agents are also received here. The 
agents communicate two values: the cumulative 
faults in element branches below the current 
branch FSb; and cumulative faults above the 
current branch FSa. The sum of FSa FSb and FSi, 
gives the total number of faults FT in the system, 
hence providing a simple, scalable method for 
communicating faults throughout the agency. 
Figure 6 shows the process of recording faults over 
three communication intervals (top to bottom), for 
a four agent HRA. At the 3rd interval all four 
agents have the correct total faults 
 
Fig. 6  Inter-agent fault communication and counting. 
 
The most reactive layer is the Control Module 
(CM), which provides the drive signal to the 
element based on the set-point, and its knowledge 
of the system status. The set-point from the global 
controller is initially fed through a feed-forward 
gain which is scheduled according to the active 
number of elements in the system. Then an inner 
control loop using local element position is 
implemented where the multiple-model control 
scheme is employed. The controller is a classical 
design, the parameters of which are chosen from a 
set of pre-computed values, again based on the 
number of active elements in the HRA. 
Finally, a knowledge module containing both 
knowledge given to the agent on start-up and that 
deduced within the individual modules links the 
layers. 
4 MACHRA Example 
This section describes the results of applying 
this MAC scheme to a HRA in simulation. A 
10x10 HRA is used as an example, as this is a 
non-trivial size system comprising a relatively 
large number of elements and as such the effect of 
faults is of a realistic dimension. The MAC 
approach is compared to passive fault tolerant 
control methods in order to determine if the 
addition of active FTC is beneficial. 
4.1 System description 
The 10x10 PS HRA is structured as shown in 
Figure 4, with ten branches of ten parallel elements 
arranged serially. The actuation elements currently 
being used within the project are SMAC 
electromagnetic actuators [25], which have been 
configured to form a lab-scale concept 
demonstrator HRA system. The modelling of these 
actuators was considered in [23], and will not be 
detailed here. A simplified 2 state element model is 
used in this example, making the overall system 
20th order. This model is included in the appendix. 
The position of the load is set as the control 
objective, and some transient requirements are 
defined for the system, suitable to the system's 
technology with good stability margins (Table 1). 
In this case the system load is six times the mass of 
the inter-element masses and it is assumed that this 
system is designed for an application with travel 
requirements that require at least 6 of the 10 
parallel branches to be operational. 
 
Table 1: Requirements. 
Requirements Example 2 10x10 HRA 
Travel window ±0.06m (6 x element travel) 
Overshoot <2% 
Steady state error 0% 
Settling time <1.2s 
 
Table 2: Fault cases. 
Case Description HRA State 
Nom. All elements are healthy Healthy and 
capable 
FC1 Branch nearest load locked Faulty, but 
capable 
FC2 2 branches nearest load locked Faulty, but 
capable 
FC3 3 branches nearest load locked Faulty, but 
capable 
FC4 4 branches nearest load locked Critical fault 
level 
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Fig. 6  Passive and multi-agent control schemes. 
 
As the PS assembly is naturally tolerant to loose 
faults in terms of travel control, they will not be 
considered here. However, element lock-ups 
immobilise the parallel branches, and thus will be 
considered. Theoretically, a 10x10 system of this 
dimensioning may incur up to 40 lock-up faults 
and still be capable of meeting its travel 
requirement. However, in a worst-case scenario, 
where single lock-ups occur in different branches, 
four lock-ups will bring the travel capability to 
critical point. The actual location of these faults, 
provided they are in separate branches, has very 
little effect on the resultant fault behaviour [26]. 
Thus, from 1 to 4 faults are injected into the 
simulation in a worst-case manner (in separate 
branches), as described in Table 2. 
4.1.1 Control Scheme 
Figure 7 portrays both the passive and MAC 
control schemes. The passive scheme has cascaded 
classical controllers designed to meet the control 
objectives in nominal conditions. These control 
laws are included in the appendix. The inner loops 
contain a phase advance compensator controlling 
the local position of each parallel branch of 
elements. This spreads the travel between the 
elements equally. An outer loop controller is then 
included to control the overall travel of the HRA's 
load. Proportional-Integral control is used in the 
outer loop to achieve the steady state requirements. 
This passive control scheme is used as the base 
for the MAC approach. Under nominal conditions, 
the MA controlled system is identical to the 
passively controlled system. However, four more 
sets of inner-loop control laws are designed based 
on the four fault modes of the system, where six to 
nine out of ten parallel branches of elements are 
active. 
Thus, on detection of a fault, this is 
communicated to the agents with healthy elements 
and their inner-loop phase advance controller 
parameters are changed according to a look-up 
table of pre-computed control laws (included in the 
appendix). The feed-forward gain in the agent's 
control module is also changed to redistribute the 
travel demand of the system i.e. if the system was 
nominal and one element locks then the gain 
would be changed from 1/10 to 1/9, as there are 
nine active parallel element branches remaining. 
This keeps the gain in the system constant. 
The outer-loop controller is not reconfigured as 
this would compromise the localisation of fault 
detection and reconfiguration decision, producing 
a potential single point of failure. 
4.1.2 Simulation of Fault Cases 
Figure 8 displays the response of the passively 
controlled and MAC 10 x 10 HRA under nominal 
and faulty conditions (Table 2), when a step 
change of 0.05m in the reference was applied at 
t=0. All faults were introduced at the beginning of 
the simulation. Table 3 gives the stability margins 
and transient characteristics of these responses. 
The passive control case, the simulations show 
that, as faults occur, the increasing load slows the 
response. Nevertheless, the passive control case 
shows some tolerance to faults, as the steady-state 
criteria is met under each fault condition due to the 
integral action of the outer loop control. However, 
the rise and settling time requirements are not met 
when two or more faults are present in the system. 
In contrast, the MAC case produces fault 
responses that are very similar to the nominal case. 
The requirements are met under each fault 
condition. 
 
Table 3: Simulation results for each fault case giving 
overshoot (OS), rise time (RT), settling time (ST), 
gain margin (GM) and phase margin (PM). 
Fault Case OS 
(%) 
RT 
(s) 
ST 
(s) 
SSE 
(%) 
GM 
(dB) 
PM 
(º) 
Nom 1.85 0.68 1.02 0 ∞ 74 
Passive FC1 1.01 0.75 1.19 0 ∞ 76 
Passive FC2 1.01 0.88 1.47 0 ∞ 79 
Passive FC3 1.01 1.05 1.88 0 ∞ 82 
Passive FC4 1.10 1.33 2.26 0 ∞ 86 
MAC FC1 1.66 0.68 1.04 0 ∞ 74 
MAC FC2 1.69 0.68 1.05 0 ∞ 75 
MAC FC3 1.93 0.71 1.07 0 ∞ 75 
MAC FC4 1.82 0.73 1.12 0 ∞ 77 
 
 
Fig. 8  Step response of passive and MAC 10 x 10 HRA. 
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4.2 Reconfiguration Delays 
The MAC results given in the previous section 
assumed that faults were detected and 
communicated instantaneously throughout the 
agency. As acknowledged in Section3, this is not a 
realistic assumption. The effect of reconfiguration 
delays Tr must be considered in the simulation if 
the results are to resemble reality. Figure 9 shows 
the transient responses of the idealised MAC 
10x10 HRA and one that includes these 
reconfiguration delays. The fault detection, 
communication and control reconfiguration are all 
simulated using State Flow, which introduces 
delays into the system. 
A square-wave input is applied to the system 
and all faults injected at t=0. The response shows 
that in the first half period of the input, delay 
effects are present in the more realistic MAC 
scheme. However, after all faults are detected, 
communicated, and control reconfigured, the 
system's behaviour returns to that of the ideal 
MAC case. 
Figure 10 shows the initial response in more 
detail. Total reconfiguration of the system was 
attained after 0.35s. This delay increases the 
settling time and overshoot of the response in the 
first half period. The overshoot limit is exceeded in 
FC1, FC2 and FC3. If this limit is critical, then the 
agent's control reconfiguration could be adjusted to 
slow down reconfiguration, or reduce control gains 
until the fault state is stable. The effects of delays 
would also be lessened if the faults did not occur 
simultaneously, which is likely to be the case in a 
real situation. 
 
Fig. 9  Transient response of passive, ideal MAC and 
MAC with delays. 
 
 
Fig. 10  Initial response of passive, ideal MAC and MAC 
with delays. 
 
These simulations show that in this case, 
moderate detection, communication and 
reconfiguration delays in the MACHRA have a 
limited influence on the performance of the system 
during reconfiguration, which is likely to be 
acceptable in application. 
4.3 Fault Detection Errors in MACHRA 
The benefit of using MAC witnessed in the 
examples is attained at the cost of a dependency on 
fault detection. As the HRA is an intended solution 
for high integrity applications, it is necessary to 
consider what would happen if this fault detection 
failed. 
As mentioned previously, fault detection errors 
in active FTC systems can be problematic. If the 
system adapts to a change that has not actually 
occurred in the system, then the results could 
degrade performance, cause faults or induce 
instability. Equally, if the system's control relies 
upon faults being detected and a fault is not 
detected then the results could be similar. Fault 
detection errors in this particular system will be 
considered here. 
4.3.1 Undetected Faults 
Undetected faults should not cause stability 
problems in this case. At worst, the system's 
response will be that of the passive case i.e. the 
system will become slower, but stability will be 
maintained. 
4.3.2 False Detection of Faults 
False detection of faults in this MACHRA 
approach will result in gain and inner control law 
changes, which could lead to instability. Table 4 
gives the overshoot, gain and phase margins in the 
case of 1-4 false lock-up detections. This is a high 
number of false detections, and one would not 
expect a well-designed fault detection scheme to 
perform so badly. However, it is worthwhile 
considering such worst-case scenarios. 
When false detections are made, the phase 
margin decreases, but the system remains stable. 
The overshoot and settling time, however, rise 
significantly. 
As proposed in Section 3 the flexibility of 
MAC can handle this problem through further 
reconfiguration. On triggering of the FDM, the 
input reference of the agent is fixed to the local 
position at time of detection and the controller is 
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changed to the PI compensator given in the 
appendix. Given sufficient gain is achievable 
(which is the case within the physical limits of this 
system), then the subsystem is forced to behave as 
the detected fault case. 
The simulation results of this approach are 
shown in Table 5. Subsequently, the phase margin 
is not eroded and the overshoot and settling time 
limit achieved. This approach will have no effect if 
the fault detected is actually present. 
 
Table 4: False detections. 
No. of False Detects 1 2 3 4 
Settling time (s) 1.85 1.92 1.93 1.66 
OS (%) 1.88 4.04 6.16 8.18 
PM (º) 72 70 68 66 
 
 
Table 5: False detection with reconfiguration 
No. of False Detects 1 2 3 4 
Settling time (s) 1.04 1.05 1.08 1.13 
OS (%) 1.58 1.51 1.66 1.57 
PM (º) 74 74 74 75 
 
5 Conclusions 
This paper has presented an active fault tolerant 
control method for high redundancy actuation. 
Multi-agent concepts have been used to provide a 
structured approach to active FTC design that deals 
with the complexity of HRA through the use of 
simple localised reconfigurable control and fault 
detection. An outline of the MAC scheme has been 
provided and an example of its application to a 
10x10 HRA given. It was shown that MAC of 
HRA can provide significant benefits in 
comparison to passive fault tolerant control, under 
the full range of fault levels. Near nominal 
performance can be maintained in worst case fault 
scenarios. 
It was shown that reconfiguration delays in 
MAC can affect the response until full 
reconfiguration has been achieved. However, these 
effects may be considered acceptable, due to their 
short lasting nature. Fault detection errors were 
also considered and it was shown that MAC has 
the flexibility to counteract the negative effects of 
false detections. 
Future work on the HRA technology concept 
itself will include practical testing and control of a 
3x4 electro-mechanical actuator. This will extend 
the work to give an indication of performance in a 
real-world situation.  In addition, future work 
concerning the reconfiguration / communication 
delays, should focus on the search for a general 
analytical solution 
 
6 Appendix 
A1  Nomenclature 
BAFT - Active fault tolerant control behaviour 
region 
bf - HRA fault mode behaviour 
BGD - Graceful degradation behaviour region 
bgd   - Behaviour of HRA when capability 
limit is exceeded i.e. a graceful 
degradation behaviour 
bn   - Nominal behaviour of the HRA as 
represented within the behavioural space 
BPFT  - Acceptable behaviour region 
d  - Damping constant, Ns/m 
F - Force, N 
Flim - The fault limit i.e. the number of 
lock-up faults a HRA is designed to 
accommodate 
FSa/FSb - Cumulative faults in element branches 
above/below the current branch 
FSi - Agent internal fault state 
FST - Total faults in HRA system 
k  - Force constant, N/A 
mn  - Inter-mass element, kg 
r  - Spring constant, N/m 
R1  - Input Resistance,  
Tcom - Fault communication delay 
Tfd Fault detection delay 
Tr - Reconfigureation time 
Ts - Settling time 
un   - Element input voltage, V 
xn   - Absolute position, m 
A2  10 x 10 PS HRA Model 
The nominal 10 x 10 HRA can be described as 
follows: 
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A methodology for providing the fault condition 
models is provided in [26]. 
A3  Control Algorithms 
Nominal and Fault Mode Control 
The outer-loop, load position controller (see 
Figure 7) in the passive FTC system and MAC 
case takes the form of equation 4. The inner loop, 
local position controller also used in these cases 
takes the form of equation 5. The control 
parameter values are given for each fault case in 
Table App. 1. It can be seen that the global 
controller parameters are stationary throughout, 
whereas the inner loop controllers are adjusted in 
response to faults in the MAC cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
App. Table 1: Control parameters under fault cases. 
Fault Case Ggl agl Gin ain bgl 
Nom 3 0.51 10 1.3 0.1 
Passive FC1 3 0.51 10 1.3 0.1 
MAC FC1 3 0.51 10 1.268 0.098 
MAC FC2 3 0.51 10 1.203 0.093 
MAC FC3 3 0.51 10 1.105 0.085 
MAC FC4 3 0.51 10 1.021 0.078 
 
Faulty Element Control 
The set-point of the faulty element's on detection 
of a fault is fixed to the position at time of 
detection and the local control law is changed to 
the following PI controller:  
           
s
s
local
PI
1
500

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